Abstract-This article describes the design of an 8-bit coprocessor for the AES (encryption, decryption, and key expansion) and the cryptographic hash function Grøstl on several Xilinx FPGAs. Our Arithmetic and Logic Unit performs a single instruction that allows for implementing AES encryption, AES decryption, AES key expansion, and Grøstl at all levels of security. Thanks to a careful organization of AES and Grøstl internal states in the register file, we manage to generate all read and write addresses by means of a modulo-128 counter and a modulo-256 counter. A fully autonomous implementation of Grøstl and AES on a Virtex-6 FPGA requires 169 slices and a single 36k memory block, and achieves a competitive throughput. Assuming that the security guarantees of Grøstl are at least as good as the ones of the other SHA-3 finalists, our results show that Grøstl is the best candidate for low-area cryptographic coprocessors.
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the successful cryptanalysis of the MD4, MD5, and SHA-0 hash functions, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has decided to develop a new algorithm to augment the Secure Hash Standard (FIPS 180-2). The public SHA-3 competition was announced in November 2007. After two rounds of internal reviews and feedback from the cryptographic community, the NIST selected 5 candidates out of 64 to advance to the final round. If security remains the main criterion, computational efficiency, memory requirement, flexibility, and simplicity are also of great significance.
Since the SHA-3 finalist Grøstl [13] is strongly inspired by the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [11] , it is tempting to design a compact unified hardware architecture which supports both algorithms. Such an implementation is valuable for constrained environments, where some security protocols mainly rely on cryptographic hash functions (see for instance [29] ). Furthermore, as emphasized by Kerckhof et al., "fully unrolled and pipelined architectures may sometimes hide a part of the algorithms' complexity that is better revealed in compact implementations" [19] . In order to have a deeper understanding of the computational efficiency of several SHA-3 candidates (resource sharing, memory access scheme, scheduling, etc.), we already designed five low-area coprocessors [1] , [7] - [9] , [24] . In particular, we proposed a compact unified architecture for the SHA-3 round 2 candidate ECHO [4] and the AES. The main originality of our work was to describe the AES by means of a single instruction [9] .
Since ECHO is built around the round function of the AES, it is rather straightforward to design a unified Arithmetic and Logic Unit (ALU) for both algorithms. In the conclusion of our article, we stated that our design strategy could be applied to Grøstl and AES. However, even if Grøstl borrows the the S-box of the AES, the construction of the diffusion layers is only based on the design philosophy of the AES. Contrary to ECHO, Grøstl can not be implemented with the AES instruction set of Intel Westmere processors [5] , and it seems much more challenging to build a compact unified coprocessor. We bring a solution to this problem in this work.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section II provides the reader with a short description of the AES and a summary of the design strategy we proposed in [9] . In Section III, we give an alternative description of Grøstl showing how to implement the algorithm with our single instruction set architecture. Then, we describe our unified 8-bit coprocessor, focusing on its control unit (Section IV). We discuss our implementation results on several Xilinx Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) in Section V and conclude in Section VI.
II. THE ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD
The round transformation of the AES operates on a 128-bit intermediate result, called state. The state is internally represented as a N l × N c array of bytes A, where N l and N c denotes the number of lines and columns, respectively. In the case of the AES, N l = N c = 4. Each byte a i,j , 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 3, is considered as an element of F 2 8 ∼ = F 2 [x]/(m(x)), where the irreducible polynomial is given by m(x) = x 8 +x 4 +x 3 +x+1. In the following, we encode an element of F 2 8 by two hexadecimal digits: for instance, 95 is equivalent to x 7 +x 4 +x 2 +1 in the polynomial basis representation. We denote the jth column of A by A j . The number of rounds N r as well as the number of 32-bit blocks in the cipher key N k of the AES depend on the desired security level (Table I) .
The AES involves four byte-oriented transformations and their inverses for encryption and decryption, respectively [11] : AddRoundKey is therefore its own inverse. After an initial AddRoundKey step, an AES encryption involves N r − 1 repetitions of a round composed of the four byte-oriented transformations described above. Eventually, a final encryption round, in which the MixColumns step is omitted, produces the ciphertext (Figure 1 ). We consider here the equivalent decryption algorithm described in [11, Section 3.7.3] . Its main advantage over the straightforward decryption process is that encryption and decryption rounds share the same datapath (Figure 1) . Nevertheless, the round keys are introduced in reverse order for decryption. A key expansion algorithm allows one to derive the round keys involved in the AddRoundKey steps from the cipher key. Let us consider an array consisting of 4 rows and 4 · (N r + 1) columns. The cipher key is copied in the first N k columns of the array, and the next columns are defined recursively (see [11, Section 3.6] for details).
If an AES coprocessor is built around an 8-bit datapath, the ShiftRows and InvShiftRows steps are implemented by accordingly addressing the register file organized into bytes. As a result, these operations are virtually for free and do not require dedicated hardware in the ALU. It is then possible to describe encryption, decryption, and key expansion with a single instruction [9] :
where
• R i , R j , and R k are vectors of N l bytes.
• A and B are matrices of N l × N l bytes. Let us define the identity matrix I AES = circ(01, 00, 00, 00) and the permutation matrix P AES = circ(00, 01, 00, 00). The latter matrix is essential to the key schedule. We showed in [9] that A can be any of the four matrices we introduced so far, whereas B is either M D or the identity matrix I AES .
• g is a function applied to each byte of R i . In addition to S RD and S
−1
RD , we need the identity function to implement the key expansion and the first AddRoundKey step of AES encryption or decryption. The first instruction of the decryption process (Figure 1 ) is for instance
Since the ALU processes the operands byte by byte, the computation of Equation (1) involves at least N l cycles. In order to achieve a high clock frequency on FPGA, it is however necessary to make the pipeline deeper. The main challenge is to schedule the instructions to avoid pipeline bubbles as much as possible.
III. THE HASH FUNCTION GRØSTL
Grøstl is a family of cryptographic hash functions able to compute message digests from 8 to 512 bits [13] . We denote by Grøstl-n the algorithm with a n-bit output and focus on the digest sizes specified for the SHA-3 competition (224, 256, 384, and 512 bits). The original message is padded, split into t message blocks of bits, and organized as an array of N l × N c bytes, where and N c depend on the desired level of security (Table II) . The number of lines N l is always equal to 8. In this work, we assume that our coprocessor is provided with a padded message and refer the reader to [13, Section 3.6] for a description of the padding algorithm. A hardware wrapper interface for Grøstl (and several other hash functions) comprising communication and padding is for instance described in [3] . Starting from an initial chaining input H (0) = IV n , the message blocks M (1) , . . . , M (t) are processed by a compression function f as:
where 1 ≤ i ≤ t. Figure 2 describes the datapath of the compression function f that consists of a key schedule, and two permutations P and Q operating on two 8 × N c array of bytes P and Q. Each byte is considered as an element of
, where m(x) = x 8 + x 4 + x 3 + x + 1 is the irreducible polynomial of the AES. Each permutation involves a first key injection followed by N r rounds consisting of four byte-oriented transformations similar to those of the AES (N r depends on the digest size and is defined in Table II Figure 2 . Flowchart of the compression function f of Grøstl.
• The ShiftBytes step cyclically rotates the ith row of P and Q to the left by σ P (i) and σ Q (i) bytes, respectively. Let T = ShiftBytes(P ) and U = ShiftBytes(Q). We have:
where 0 ≤ i ≤ 7 and 0 ≤ j ≤ N c − 1. The offsets σ P (i) and σ Q (i) depend on the row index i and the number of columns N c , and are defined in Table III .
• The SubBytes step updates each byte of P and Q using the AES S-box, denoted by S RD . 
• The MixBytes step is performed by multiplying each column of P and Q by the circulant matrix M Grøstl = circ(02, 02, 03, 04, 05, 03, 05, 07).
• The AddRoundKey step combines P and Q with two -bit round keys. The key expansion requires N r · N c 64-bit constants that can be computed on-the-fly according to Algorithm 1. Since the round counter r and the loop index j are 4-bit numbers (N r ≤ 14 and N c − 1 ≤ 15), each k i,r·Nc+j can be seen as an element of F 2 8 .
Algorithm 1 Computation of the round constants.
Input: N r (number of rounds of the permutation P ) and N c (number of columns of the internal state). Output: The N r ·N c round constants required to compute the permutation P .
4.
end for 7. end for 8. end for
Besides the round constants, the key expansion involves the chaining input H and a permutation matrix P Grøstl = circ(00, 01, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00) ( Figure 2 ). Finally, note that the output of P serves as the key of the last round of Q . Algorithm 2 describes how we implement Grøstl using the instruction defined by Equation (1). The ShiftBytes step (i.e. computation of T j and U j on lines 10, 17, 25, and 32) is performed by accordingly addressing the register file organized into bytes. As a result, these operations are virtually for free and do not require dedicated hardware in the ALU. Since the ShiftBytes transformations performs cyclical left shifts of the rows of the state, we have to be careful not to overwrite bytes that are still involved in the forthcoming MixBytes steps (p 1,0 is for instance needed to update the eighth column of P , and should not be overwritten when updating the first column). We solve this problem by introducing two 8 × N c arrays of bytes P and Q to store intermediate results. The coprocessor we will describe in Section IV embeds a number of pipeline stages, and several clock cycles are required to process a byte of the state. In order to avoid data dependency issues between two consecutive rounds of a given permutation, we interleave the computation of P and Q .
After the last message block has been processed, an output transformation based on P generates the n-bit digest D (Algorithm 3). The function trunc n (P ) (line 19) discards all but the n trailing bits of P . Table IV provides the reader with a summary of the instructions involved in the compression function and the output transformation.
IV. A COMPACT UNIFIED COPROCESSOR FOR THE AES
AND THE GRØSTL FAMILY OF HASH FUNCTIONS Figure 3 describes how we modified the 8-bit coprocessor proposed by Beuchat et al. [9] in order to share the same Algorithm 2 Compression function f of Grøstl. Input: A -bit message block M and a chaining value H. Output: A new chaining value H .
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datapath between Grøstl and the AES. The architecture is built around an 8-bit datapath and consists of three main components:
• a register file and a key memory implemented by means of a single dual-ported memory block; address bits and write enable signals are denoted by a 39:0 and we 3:0 , respectively; • a control unit responsible for the address generation and the selection of the parameters A, B, and g (Table IV ); • an ALU implementing the instruction defined by Equation (1), the key expansion mechanism of the AES, and the computation of the round constants of Grøstl. 
end for 9 .
end for
11.
P ← P ; 12. end for 13. for j ← 0 to N c − 1 do 14. for i ← 0 to 7 do 15.
end for 17 .
A. Memory Organization
Since we consider an 8-bit datapath, the memory of our coprocessor is organized into bytes. We will show below that ten address bits are needed to access message blocks and intermediate data, thus allowing us to implement the register file and the key memory by means of a single Virtex-6 block RAM configured as two independent 18 Kb RAMs (Figure 3) .
Recall that each variable of Grøstl-n is an array of 8 × N c bytes and that the compression function of Grøstl requires six variables: a chaining value H, a message block M , P , P , Q, and Q (Algorithm 2). Since N c ≤ 16 (Table II) , we define six chunks of 128 bytes in the register file (Figure 4) , and address each byte with 10 bits:
• the three most significant bits select the desired variable;
• the next four bits encode the column index j;
• the three least significant bits define the row index i. The addresses of h i,j and p i,j are for instance given by 8j + i and 256 + 8j + i, respectively. The key memory stores:
• a copy of the chaining value H required to implement the key schedule (lines 2 and 27 of Algorithm 2, and line 17 of Algorithm 3); • the initial chaining values IV 224 , IV 256 , IV 384 , and IV 512 ;
• a copy of P needed to perform the AddRoundKey step of the last round of Q (line 34 of Algorithm 2). We keep the memory organization proposed in [9] for the AES. Note that the execution of Grøstl-n does not overwrite the round keys of the AES. As long as the AES master key is not modified, it is therefore possible to switch between the hash function and the block cipher with no need for the AES KeyExpansion step. In the following, we show that our careful organization of the data in the register file and in the key memory allows one to design a control unit based on a 256-bit counter, a 128-bit counter, and a simple Finite State Machine (FSM).
B. Control Unit
The control bits of the ALU, the read and write addresses of the register file and the key memory, and the write enable signals are computed by a control unit that mainly consists of an address generator and an instruction memory. At first glance, it seems that each algorithm (AES key expansion, AES encryption, AES decryption, P , and Q ) requires a different addressing scheme. However, we described a way to generate all read and write addresses of the AES and the hash function ECHO [4] by means of a modulo-16 counter and a modulo-256 counter in our previous work [9] . The same design philosophy allows us to generate the addresses of Grøstl. Since the internal state contains up to 128 bytes, we have to replace the modulo-16 counter by a modulo-128 counter. Our control unit generates a read address and its corresponding write address at each clock cycle. Since our coprocessor embeds several pipeline stages, it is mandatory to delay write addresses and write enable signals accordingly. Furthermore, the latency depends on the algorithm being executed (Figure 3 ). On Xilinx devices, an efficient solution consists in synchronizing control signals by means of SRL16 primitives, whose depth can be dynamically adjusted.
The three most significant bits of read and write addresses select a block of 128 bytes in the memory, and their generation is quite straightforward. We refer the reader to our open source VHDL code and to [9] for further details. Therefore, we focus only on the generation of the seven least significant bits (i.e.
g(Ri)
• Identity (IGrøstl) SubBytes MD = circ(0E, 0B, 0D, 09) IGrøstl = circ(01, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00) PGrøstl = circ(00, 01, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00) the location of a byte in the internal state) in the following. Note that we
• interleave the computation of P and Q in order to avoid data dependencies between two consecutive rounds and • implement the ShiftBytes step by accordingly addressing the register file. Figures 5 and 6 summarize the address generation process of Grøstl-256 and Grøstl-512, respectively. At each clock cycle, a new read address is generated by adding a 7-bit offset to the current read address. The rules summarized in Table V allow one to compute the offset according to the permutation being executed. They involve the following signals:
• depending on the value of , Counter is a modulo-64 counter or a modulo-128 counter used to enumerate the bytes of the internal state (it simply consists of the six or seven least significant bits of the modulo-256 counter, and defines the write address of the register file); • Switch is a 1-bit signal equal to one if and only if we are performing the last step of P or Q ; • Ω is a 1-bit flag indicating that the output transformation is carried out. Consider for instance Q 1024 and assume that Counter = (0010001) 2 = 17. We compute the offset according to Table V and obtain:
Since the current read address is equal to 41, the next read address is given by (41 + Offset) mod 128 = 58. Counter is now equal to (0010010) 2 = 18 and the new offset is given by:
The computation of Offset 4 involves seven inputs: Ω, Switch, the three least significant bits of Counter, and two bits to define the permutation (P 512 , Q 512 , P 512 or Q 512 ). On modern Xilinx devices, it is implemented by means of two 6-input Look-Up Tables (LUTs) and a dedicated multiplexer (F7AMUX or F7BMUX). Since Offset 5 and Offset 6 share the same five inputs, they are generated thanks to a LUT with two independent outputs (LUT6 2 primitive). A fourth LUT allows us to compute Offset 3 . Thus, we defined an extremely lightweight address generation process for Grøstl. It can easily be combined with the addressing scheme of the AES described in [9] . The output transformation requires special attention: since it involves only P , five idle clock cycles between two consecutive rounds are mandatory to avoid memory collisions. Let us consider the ith round of Grøstl-256 to describe the problem (Figure 7) . The control unit generates the address of p 7,6 (read operation) and p 7,7 (write operation) at time t. However, our coprocessor includes D = 12 pipeline stages and we write the new value of p 7,7 in the register file at time t + D. In order to update the first column of the internal state P , we have to read p 0,0 , p 1,1 , p 2,2 , p 3,3 , p 4,4 , p 5,5 , p 6, 6 , and p 7,7 . The latter is available on port A of the register file at time t + D + 1, which means that p 0,0 can be read at time t + D − 6 = t + 6. It is therefore necessary to introduce five idle clock cycles between two rounds.
Table VI summarizes the number of clock cycles required for the AES and Grøstl. In the case of the AES, we obtain exactly the same results as in [9] . Thanks to our careful organization of the memory, we achieve a perfectly tight scheduling (no idle cycle) for the compression function of Grøstl.
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C. Arithmetic and Logic Unit
The SubBytes and InvSubBytes steps are often considered as the most critical part of the AES, and several architectures for S RD and S −1 RD have already been described in the open literature (see for instance [12] for a comprehensive bibliography). On Xilinx Virtex-6 FPGAs, the best design strategy consists in implementing the AES S-boxes as 8-input tables [10] . Two control bits ctrl 1:0 allow us to perform SubBytes, InvSubBytes, or to bypass this stage when g is the identity function.
In the case of the AES, the first matrix multiplication of Equation (1) can involve any of the four circulant matrices defined in Section II. Grøstl requires only I Grøstl and M Grøstl . Let us define the control signal AES/Grøstl whose role is to identify the algorithm being executed. Together with two control bits ctrl 3:2 , this signal allows us to select matrix A. The choice of matrix B turns out to be simpler and requires a single extra control bit ctrl 6 (Figure 3 ).
Since we emphasize reducing the usage of FPGA resources, we adopt the multiply-and-accumulate approach proposed by Hämäläinen et al. [14] , and need N l clock cycles to multiply one column of the state or the round key array by a circulant matrix (Figures 8 and 9 ). We compute a first partial product and store the result in registers r 0 to r N l . Then, at each clock cycle, the intermediate result is rotated and accumulated with a new partial product. This process involves a Shift control signal to distinguish between the first step and the subsequent ones. Such a signal can be generated by computing the bitwise OR of the bits of a modulo-N l counter. Let us consider the three bits c 2:0 of a modulo 8 counter. Since N l = 4 and N l = 8 for AES and Grøstl, respectively, we define Note that the rotation mechanism depends on the algorithm being executed: the AES involves registers r 0 , r 1 , r 2 , and r 3 , whereas Grøstl requires eight registers to store intermediate results. Therefore, the feedback mechanism is implemented by means of a multiplexer controlled by AES/Grøstl. We describe in Appendix how to optimize the MixColumns and MixBytes steps on the latest Xilinx FPGAs. Figure 10 describes the component we designed to perform the AddRoundKey and KeyExpansion steps. Since our matrix multiplication units output N l bytes, we perform N l additions over F 2 8 in parallel and store the result in a shift register. Then, we write data byte by byte in the register file, and a modulo-N l counter controls the process. Therefore, it suffices to delay our Shift signal by a total of N l clock cycles, which is the latency of a matrix-vector multiplication. Additional hardware resources allow us to deal with the round constant RC involved in the key expansion of the AES (see [9] for details).
The last operation we have to consider is the AddRoundKey step of Grøstl. In order to compute p i,j (Algorithm 2, line 12), we generate k i,r·Nc+j on-the-fly. Recall that:
• i is a 3-bit row index;
• j is a 4-bit column index;
• r is a 4-bit round index. The indices i and j are given by the control signal a 26:20 = j i = 8j + i (Figure 3 ). According to Algorithm 1, we have:
Since i = a 22:20 and j = a 26:23 , we can rewrite the above equation as follows: eight 2-input AND gates. A multiplexer controlled by ctrl 5:4 allows us to inject k i,r·Nc+j , ¬k i,r·Nc+j , k i,j ⊕ h i,j (first key injection of P ), or a variable stored in the key memory.
V. RESULTS AND COMPARISONS
We captured our architecture in the VHDL language and prototyped our coprocessor on several Xilinx FPGAs with average speedgrade. Table VII summarizes our place-androute results measured with ISE 14.2. In order to evaluate the hardware overhead introduced by the AES, we designed a second coprocessor that implements only Grøstl-256 and Grostl-512 (Table VIII) . It is possible to reduce the number of slices by implementing a subset of the functionalities (e.g. a single level of security, AES without key expansion, etc.).
Our coprocessor requires a similar number of slices and achieves the same clock frequency as the architecture we designed for ECHO and AES [9] . However, the implementation of Grøstl on our architecture involves a smaller number of instructions and the throughput turns out to be slightly higher than the one of ECHO. Therefore, two conclusions we drew in our previous work can be transposed here:
• Helion Technology [26] is selling a tiny AES core that implements encryption, decryption, and key expansion at all levels of security. The coprocessor occupies only 88 Virtex-6 slices and achieves a throughput of 83 Mbps in the case of AES-128. Our unified coprocessor is almost twice as big, but we achieve a better encryption/decryption rate and improve the area-time product compared to the tiny AES core designed by Helion Technology. Thus, combining the hash function Grøstl with the AES does not impact the overall performance of the latter.
• The unified core for SHA-1, SHA-224/256, and SHA-384/512 designed by Helion Technology [25] turns out to be larger and slightly slower than our coprocessor. Furthermore, the Helion commercial core must be supplemented with an AES core to provide the same functionalities as our architecture. Assuming that the security of Grøstl is at least as good as the one of SHA-2, Grøstl is a clear winner for resource-constrained devices. Järvinen [15] proposed the first unified coprocessor for AES-128 (encryption and key expansion) and Grøstl-256. Recently, Rogawski & Gaj [23] designed a parallel coprocessor for Grøstl-based HMAC and AES in the counter mode. Both architectures are optimized for high-speed implementations, and it is therefore difficult to make a comparison with our unified coprocessor. We report in Table IX the latest FPGA implementation results of the five SHA-3 finalists (see for instance [20] , [21] for a survey of parallel architectures). We consider here the least favorable case for Grøstl, in which a single block is processed. The throughput of Grøstl-256 is for instance given by: throughput = 512 · #blocks (1411 · #blocks + 757) · T , where T denotes the clock period. When the number of blocks increases, one can neglect the cost of the output transformation and the throughput tends asymptotically to 512/(1411 · T ).
Most of the architectures described in the open literature focus on a single level of security. In this context, BLAKE [2] is obviously the best choice for low-area implementations on FPGA. However, as soon as a circuit must support several levels of security, Grøstl will offer the most compact solution.
VI. CONCLUSION
The design philosophy we proposed in [9] allowed us to develop a low-area coprocessor for the AES (encryption, decryption, and key expansion) and the cryptographic hash function Grøstl at all levels of security. Our architecture is built around an 8-bit datapath and the ALU performs a APPENDIX Figure 11 describes how we take advantage of the LUT6 2 primitive in order to optimize MixColumns and MixBytes steps on the latest Xilinx FPGAs. The first step of a multipli- 
